Block 1.4: History & Methods of Psychology

Philosophical Roots of Psychology

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Thales of Miletus (640-550 BC) and the "Milesian" philosophers

- turned away from supernaturalism
- raised two fundamental topics in philosophy

1. Ontology

• "What is the universe in reality?"

2. Epistemology

• "How is experience generated by it?"

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Elementalism and Reductionism

Elementalism

- $\bullet\,$ seeks to understand a complex phenomenon by breaking it up into component parts.
- \bullet body and it's subsystems (e.g. nervous & cardiovascular) and it's component parts (e.g. cellular, molecular & atomic).
- $\bullet\,$ All these components are biological and remain at the same level (non-reductive)

Reductionism

- two different domains or levels of organization
- explains the higher level in terms of the lower-level phenomena
- Example: mental functions in terms of the underlying biology/neurology
 - ignoring the influence of development, sociocultural, ect...
 - $\ \ \,$ The impact of language, of ideas and meanings is lost

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Parmenides

Appearance versus Reality

- impossible to have knowledge of that which is changing continuously
 - How can one know with any certainty whether something different tomorrow?
 - \blacksquare In order to arrive at a true understanding one must seek what is eternal and constant (Being)
 - The material world revealed by the senses is of appearance and illusion and of Becoming.
 - $\ ^{\bullet}$ Truth, which is in \mathbf{Being} is revealed not by the senses but by reason

Rationalism

- we can only access true knowledge via reasoning (cf. Plato)
- $\bullet\,$ determiner of truth was reason
- ${\bf Idealism}$ (cf. mind-body problem) because the ultimate principle of 'Being' is a concept

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Ontology

"What is the universe in reality?"

First philosophers

- origins of nature: existing things are formed by substances
- · Is there both mind and matter, physical and non-physical things?
- Monism, Dualism, and Pluralism

Mechanism and Determinism

Early atomists such as *Leucippus* (5th century BC) and *Democritus* (460–370 BC)

- everything (body & mind) is just a collection of atoms
- fiery atoms come together with mass \rightarrow mind, sleep or death: fiery atom loss mass
- qualitative differences are explained by reduction to quantitative differences
- qualitative change reduction to spatial movements

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Epistemology

"How is experience generated by it?"

- What do/can we know?
- Role of perception in knowledge

Heraclitus


- stressing change
- "Becoming" in contrast to "Being"
- "everything is in constant flux"

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Appearance versus Reality in Modern Psychology

The problem of knowledge or epistemology is a psychological problem!



Helmholtz (1866)


- distal stimulus (objective object, "reality")
- proximal stimulus (sensory representation, appearance).

) Oppel Blusion (1854): Despite being the same length the filled-in portion appears longer than the bia portion.

 Müller-Lyer Illusion (1889): Despite being the same length the upper horizontal line appears longe the lower.

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Mind-Body Problem

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What is the Mind-Body Problem?

Inconsistent tetrad

- 1. The mind is a nonphysical thing.
- 2. The body is a physical thing.
- 3. The mind and the body interact.
- 4. Physical and nonphysical things cannot interact.

One notion must be wrong

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Dualism

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Rène Descartes (1596–1650): Cartesian Dualism


Law of Contradiction

- Opposites are mutually exclusive.
- holds that something cannot both \emph{be} and $\emph{not-be}$ ($A \neq \text{not-}A$).
- 1. Sensory experience could be deceptive (illusions) or we could be dreaming. Thinking must be completely independent of the body.
- 2. Different identities
 - Body: spatial (location and extended) and divisible
 - $\boldsymbol{Mind: non\text{-}spatial}$ (no location, no extend) and $\boldsymbol{indivisible}$
 - They must be two distinct entities
- 3. Mind and body must be considered incommensurable (having nothing in common).


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Descartes: Interactionism

- Mind and body interact
- ullet Example: hand on fire o pain



• Pineal gland in the brain is the "contact point" between mind and brain



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Critique

How can physical and nonphysical things interact?

- 1. The mind is a nonphysical thing.
- 2. The body is a physical thing.
- 3. The mind and the body interact.
- 4. Physical and nonphysical things cannot interact.

Occasionalism

Nicolas Malebranche (16-38–1715)

- Mind and body are completely separate and independent,
- but an correspondence exists between them,
- (Christian) God as the cause of everything in the universe
- God maintaining the correspondence.



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Double Aspect Theory

Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677)

- there is only one substance (God)
- the mental and the physical as attributes of God
- dualistic view, attributes do **not interact**
- but the are associated due the same influence of the natural laws that affect both



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(Psychophysical) Parallelism

Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

- mind and body are parallel (do not interact)
- the are correlated
- · pre-established harmony
- Examples
 - synchronized clocks
 - Example: multiple choirs singing the same song

Wundt

- psychological or psychometric research
- changes in the brain do not correlate with changes in





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Epiphenomenalism

Thomas Huxley (1825–1895)

- epiphenomena appears *in addition* to the basic phenomena
- physical events cause mental events but mental events do not cause physical events.
- mind a by-product of the mechanism of body
 - like steam of a running locomotive
- volition is an emotion that "indicate" physical changes, but that does not cause it
- What about the possibility of free will?

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Monism: Idealism & Materialism

The rejection of the proposition that both mind or matter exist. There is only one thing

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Idealism/Anti-materialism

Idealism states that everything, including the body, is non-physical or mental.

 Materialist have difficulties explaining the non-physical experiences of our senses (qualia).

How can the body be non-physical?

- Phenomenalism tries to solves this
- all statements about physical things (incl. the body) are at bottom statements about experiences.

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Excursus: Qualia

Thomas Nagel (1974): "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"

• Example: Even if we know all physical facts about echolocation, we don't understand what it feels like to be a bat.



Qualia: The concept of subjective experience in philosophy

- challenges reductionist theories of the mind
- $\bullet\,$ questioning whether all aspects of the mind can be fully reduction to physical processes

Nagel's conclusion: organism's mind and experiences are inherently subjective and can be understood only from its own point of view.

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Neutral monism

- the world consist of one primal stuff (neither mental nor physical).
- W. James call "pure experience"
- Modern concepts might be something like "energy"

Materialism

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Eliminative materialism

"There is no mind!"

- · Eliminativism resolves the mind-body problem by removing mind
- anti-mentalism

Behaviourism in Philosophy and Psychology

- Sensation and perception are discriminatory responses to different stimuli
- the mind is not observable and can't be investigated
- see last lecture:
 - problems of introspection vs.
 - qualitative measurements of the mind (just noticeable difference)

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Eliminative materialism II

Identity Theory

- Neuroscience led to an alternative materialist theory
- Mental states are nothing else than states of the brain (neuronal activity)

Critique

- Eliminativist deny the phenomena like
 - mental images, experiences, pains, desires, beliefs, judging, questioning, inferring, and asserting
- difficult to get around experience (cf. ${\bf qualia}$)as the basis of knowledge \to you to account for awareness and subjectivity

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Naturalism

- "weak" from of materialism
- not reductive materialism
- acknowledges thoughts, feelings, emotions, and rational inquiry
- but it would be pure speculation to assume that mental events did not depend on physical processes
- · Mental events are contingent on physiological events
- if there is no organized bodies, there would be no mental states

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Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976)

- criticized (Cartesian) dualism
- the mind-body problem was a valid question (in contrast to Dewey)

Is the mind-body problem a useful question?

• refutes substance dualism as well as monism (idealism and materialism)

Category Mistake

- Body and mind are different categories (or levels of description) of same thing
- Examples of this logical mistake
 - Visitor at the University of Oxford. After seeing everything there he ask "...and where is the university?"
 - Why is it was wrong to say "there are 3 things in a field: two cows & a pair of cows"

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Critique: John Dewey (1859–1952)

- asking the question of mind and body is already a mistake
- rejected the absolute disunity
- tradition in philosophy and science of separation and isolation
- $\bullet \ \textit{Example} \ \text{from personality psychology}$
 - person and environment/situation treated as "separate" entities

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Questions?



Thank you very much



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